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[Jakarta, 3 April 2024] All parties to the peace process in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) need to take steps now to reduce the potential for political violence in the lead-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections.
The latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), <a title="Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-93-Philippines-Political-Jockeying-and-violence-before-the-2025-elections-in-BARMM.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM&rdquo;</a>, analyses the different power blocs that will determine the outcome of the 2025 elections and the political jockeying and alliance-building that has already begun.&nbsp; The stakes are huge. &ldquo;While the peace process itself doesn&rsquo;t hang in the balance,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, senior adviser to IPAC, &ldquo;the quality of the peace does, and the impact of the 2025 elections will be enormous.&rdquo;
The report explores the mechanics of the elections, the battle to control economic resources, the way in which traditional politicians have moved into king-maker roles, the implications of victory or defeat for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and some of the contentious issues that are raising hackles. These include the gerrymandering undertaken by the MILF leadership in an effort to boost the chances for its party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), and a probably doomed effort to ban political dynasties. It also looks at why the last phase of &ldquo;normalisation&rdquo; and the decommissioning of MILF fighters has moved so slowly and why it would be in the interest of everyone to speedily complete it.
The 2025 elections for an 80-seat parliament will be the culmination of the peace process that produced the momentous 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The sources of potential violence, however, are many, from politicians determined to win seats at any cost, disgruntled combatants, a rift in the top ranks of the MILF leadership, and remnants of pro-ISIS groups determined to disrupt democratic procedures.
All parties need to take steps now to prevent deadly conflict. The government needs to map particularly tense areas and assign additional security forces. It also needs to work with civil society and universities to identify and respond to threats and disinformation on social media. Police need to avoid serving arrest warrants on former (and possibly armed) combatants without prior communication with those who can negotiate a peaceful surrender. The MILF needs to get its own house in order. Finally, all local political parties based on the Mindanao mainland need to reach out to the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi to ensure their concerns are reflected in programs and Cabinet choices once the elections are over.
&ldquo;Violence can&rsquo;t be eliminated but it can surely be reduced,&rdquo; says Jones. &ldquo;Keeping conflict to a minimum before the elections will help give the new government, once in office, the best chance of living up to the aspirations of those who worked for so long to bring it into being.&rdquo;
&nbsp;

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All parties to the peace process in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) need to take steps now to reduce the potential for political violence in the lead-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM

[Jakarta, 28 February 2024] The keys to successful deradicalisation programs in Indonesia are careful targeting, sustained personal attention, and provision of selected religious reading materials to those in prison.
<a title="An Indonesian Deradicalisation Program that Works" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-92-An-Indonesian-Deradicalisation-Program-that-Works-rev.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;An Indonesian Deradicalisation Program that Works&rdquo;,</a> the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta, examines one program undertaken by a unit of Detachment 88, Indonesia&rsquo;s counter-terrorism police, that has successfully changed the way that a group of formerly hardline ideologues think about violent jihad.
&ldquo;The accepted wisdom for the last decade is that the aim of prison programs should be to change behaviour, not ideology,&rdquo; says Syafiq Hasyim, IPAC research director. &ldquo;But this program has demonstrated that with the right approach, former extremists can come to realise that their interpretation of religious texts is flawed.&rdquo;
The report looks at how a Densus unit, IDENSOS (an acronym for the Directorate of Identification and Socialisation), was apparently able to convince four imprisoned pro-ISIS leaders that they had been misled and that several of their ideological premises were wrong. The four were Kiki Muhammad Iqbal, a two-time recidivist from West Java; William Maksum, a religious teacher from Bandung; Iskandar alias Abu Qutaidah from Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, who had served as spokesman for a prisoner uprising against police and prison staff in 2018; and Ustad Yasin, a cleric whose school became the centre of ISIS activity in central Sulawesi. In all cases, there were other factors besides the IDENSOS program that led them to question their beliefs but the sustained attention from police who themselves were devout Muslims was a crucial element.
The report examines the history of deradicalisation initiatives in Indonesia and how approaches have changed over time. It also notes that even the successful IDENSOS program faces obstacles in implementation. These include corruption in prison that allows wealthy narcotics dealers and white-collar corruptors to pay their way into less harsh prison regimes, taking up space that deradicalised prisoners have been promised. Bureaucratic procedures sometimes mean that those prisoners, promised early release, have to wait until well beyond their scheduled release for paperwork to be completed, creating new grievances. Punishing corruption and streamlining procedures would strengthen the IDENSOS program.
IPAC also recommends that more attention be made to women&rsquo;s networks outside prisons, since the attitude of spouses can be a major factor in whether in-prison transformations of male prisoners can be sustained after their release.
&nbsp;

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The keys to successful deradicalisation programs in Indonesia are careful targeting, sustained personal attention, and provision of selected religious reading materials to those in prison.

An Indonesian Deradicalisation Program that Works

[Jakarta, 6 February 2024] The incoming president of Indonesia needs to learn from local initiatives in Papua if he wants to reduce the high level of deaths and displacement.&nbsp; After ten years, President Jokowi has left a pro-independence insurgency, the West Papua National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional &ndash; Papua Barat, PNPB) that is better armed, resourced, and coordinated than it was when he took office. His successor needs to radically change course.
<a title="Managing Conflict in Papua: Suggestions for a New President" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-91-Managing-Conflict-in-Papua-Suggestions-for-a-New-President_06-02-2024.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;Managing Conflict in Papua: Suggestions for a New President,&rdquo; </a>the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), examines why various Papua initiatives attempted by post-Soeharto presidents have failed. These approaches can be characterized as &ldquo;Get them to like us&rdquo;, &ldquo;Hit them without mercy&rdquo;, &ldquo;Divide and rule&rdquo;, &ldquo;Give them money&rdquo;, &ldquo;End their isolation&rdquo; and very occasionally, &ldquo;Talk to them&rdquo;.&nbsp; But all have been marked by an effort to treat Papua as an undifferentiated whole and a lack of in-depth knowledge of local actors and dynamics. Instead, a new administration could learn from a &ldquo;live and let live&rdquo; approach of Lanny Jaya district, where violence steadily declined between 2018 and 2023, despite the strong presence of both guerillas and security forces.
The Lanny Jaya model was based on constant communication between local officials with both the TPNPB and local military and a determined effort to keep them out of each other&rsquo;s way. It involved meeting the basic needs of the guerrillas and their families but also providing the security forces with enough information so that they could provide accurate reports back to Jakarta. The flood of troops into the area after the abduction of the New Zealand pilot in 2023 may have undermined this approach.
&ldquo;It&rsquo;s clear that top-down, Papua-wide initiatives that involve multiple actors from both government and the independence movement don&rsquo;t work,&rdquo; says Deka Anwar, IPAC researcher. &ldquo;The Lanny Jaya model is not a long-term solution to the conflict, but at least it can buy time and build trust as the level of violence is reduced.&rdquo;
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The incoming president of Indonesia needs to learn from local initiatives in Papua if he wants to reduce the high level of deaths and displacement.

Managing Conflict in Papua: Suggestions for a New President

[Jakarta, 31 January 2024] The employment of dozens of former extremist prisoners and ex-combatants from Poso in the nickel mining industry in Morowali, Central Sulawesi could pose a risk if social conflict erupts in the area and the former militants are pressured to take sides. The best guarantee against re-radicalisation of these individuals is for the companies operating in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) to guard against rising tensions by promoting cross-ethnic activities, improving health and safety conditions, guaranteeing pay equity, and not suppressing worker complaints.
<a title="Ex-Militants in the Nickel Mining Industry in Central Sulawesi" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-90-Ex-Militants-in-the-Nickel-Industry-in-Central-Sulawesi_31-01-2024.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;Ex-Militants in the Nickel Mining Industry in Central Sulawesi&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), notes that some 40 former ex-prisoners and combatants from Poso are involved as security guards or smelter workers in IMIP or are part of a network supplying diesel to businesses, including mining companies, that they buy at a subsidised price and sell at a mark-up. Many of these men were associated with Mujahidin Kompak from the Kayamanya neighbourhood of Poso. There are also former members of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). Most are only interested in making money, not causing trouble, and some who have renounced violence could even be in a position to play a constructive role in mediating conflict. But as ethnic tensions and protests at unsafe working conditions rise within IMIP, others among the ex-prisoners could be drawn in.&nbsp;
&ldquo;If the government truly wants to ensure that the former prisoners stay disengaged from violence,&rdquo; says Siswo Mulyartono, an IPAC researcher, &ldquo;they need to ensure that the mining industry around IMIP is better managed.&rdquo;
The report notes that of all the problems at IMIP, the rise in ethnic tensions probably carries the most risk of escalating into violence, and there already have been several clashes. Those involving mainland Chinese and local workers have attracted media attention, but the more dangerous problem is the hardening of ethnic identities between local Muslims and migrants from Christian areas coming up from Toraja in South Sulawesi, to the point that some workers write their ethnic or religious identity on their hardhats. Thus far the problem has been manageable, mostly because no Muslim has been killed and no mosque damaged in the incidents.&nbsp;
&ldquo;Given the history of conflict in Poso and Morowali,&rdquo; says Siswo, &ldquo;everyone needs to stay vigilant.&rdquo;

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The employment of dozens of former extremist prisoners and ex-combatants from Poso in the nickel mining industry in Morowali, Central Sulawesi could pose a risk if social conflict erupts in the area and the former militants are pressured to take sides.

Ex-Militants in the Nickel Industry in Central Sulawesi

[Jakarta, 20 October 2023] Indonesian Islamists are unlikely to have any significant impact on the 2024 general elections or engage in violent protests if their candidates of choice are defeated. The Jokowi government has successfully marginalised the leading Islamist groups, and no candidate for president is likely to rely on their support for partisan advantage, even with the Gaza war as a backdrop.
These are the major findings of the <a title="Indonesian Islamists in the Lead-Up to the 2024 Elections" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-89-Indonesian-Islamists-in-the-Lead-Up-to-the-2024-Elections-20-10-2023.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Indonesian Islamists in the Lead-Up to the 2024 Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). The report examines the pre-election strategies of four groups: the Islamic Brotherhood Front (Front Persaudaraan Islam, FPI), formerly the Islamic Defenders Front; two Salafi-modernist organisations, Wahdah Islamiyah and Arrahman Qur&rsquo;anic Learning (AQL); and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
There are several reasons why the Islamists are weaker than they were in 2019. The government anti-radicalisation campaign has worked, leaving some of the groups banned and their leaders arrested, and others lying low. They are no longer united. And the country is no longer as religiously polarised as it was in 2019.&nbsp;&nbsp;
The four groups discussed in the new report have chosen different strategies to respond to government pressure. The FPI, banned in December 2020, changed its name but kept the same initials, and began to focus more on religion and regeneration and less on paramilitary activities. Wahdah Islamiyah drew close to the government and has focused on expanding its educational networks. AQL leader Bachtiar Nasir kept out of the limelight, but also has successfully expanded his schools and online religious outreach programs. While avoiding comment on any domestic issues, he has advised his followers to consider the presidential candidates&rsquo; commitment to addressing the Palestinian plight when they make their choice in 2024. HTI, though banned since 2017, has continued its recruiting, training and publication programs as though nothing had happened, but without using its name in public. It will not take part in the 2024 elections.
The groups at present support former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, but most polls show him running a distant third to Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi&rsquo;s opponent in 2019 and Defence Minister thereafter, and Ganjar Pranowo, former governor of Central Java. If Anies is eliminated, some Islamists could back Prabowo, but without enthusiasm. Some in Wahdah could back Ganjar, though they dislike him and his party, only because they like his running mate, Mahfud MD.&nbsp;
Even if the Islamists have been marginalised this time around, they are not a spent force, the report warns. They have unmatched perseverance, resourcefulness, and optimism in the face of adversity, and they are not going away.

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Indonesian Islamists are unlikely to have any significant impact on the 2024 general elections or engage in violent protests if their candidates of choice are defeated.

Indonesian Islamist Groups in the Lead-Up to the 2024 Elections

[Jakarta, 14 September 2023] Political violence is likely to worsen, particularly in central Mindanao, as village elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) draw closer. These elections, scheduled for late October 2023, will put in place the get-out-the-vote machinery for the much more important vote in 2025, when voters for the first time will choose members of the BARMM parliament. Everything points to the traditional clans of Mindanao and the island provinces of Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi further entrenching themselves in 2025, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) losing control of the region it helped set up through long, laborious peace negotiations.&nbsp;
&nbsp;<a title="Violence in the Southern Philippines" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-88-Violence-in-the-Southern-Philippines-in-the-Lead-Up-to-Local-Election-18092023.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;Violence in the Southern Philippines in the Lead-up to Local Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), notes that more is at stake in 2025 than MILF control. The power of the political bosses has grown to the point that in the name of preventing violence, they are increasingly trying to ensure that their candidates at a local level run unopposed.&nbsp; &ldquo;There is something deeply amiss if you have to deny voters a choice in the name of ensuring their security,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, IPAC senior adviser. &ldquo;It means the political machines will always win.&rdquo;
The report looks in depth at the situation in Sulu and Maguindanao, now divided into Maguindanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Norte. It looks at the political dynamics in these provinces as elections approach, including the efforts of the MILF&rsquo;s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) to cut deals with traditional leaders in order to secure more seats. It also examines recent outbreaks of violence in these areas, which are a reminder, if any is needed, of how heavily armed this region still is.&nbsp;
To put the UBJP&rsquo;s electoral woes in perspective, the report compares the context in BARMM with Aceh in Indonesia, where guerrillas also turned themselves into politicians after a peace process, ran in local elections for the first time in 2006 against Jakarta-backed politicians, and won by a landslide when they were expected to lose. But BARMM in 2023 is vastly more complicated than Aceh was then, and the comparison shows how difficult UBJB&rsquo;s task will be, both in October and late in 2025.
If the risk of conflict is to be reduced, the government needs to do more to address private armed groups and unregistered weapons; break the patronage link between local political bosses and the police; speed up the amnesty process; and ensure independent investigations into incidents of violence that become highly politicised. The MILF, for its part, needs to do more to show voters in BARMM that it can govern cleanly and competently.

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Political violence is likely to worsen, particularly in central Mindanao, as village elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) draw closer.

Violence in the Southern Philippines in the Lead-Up to Local Elections

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